Keyholding Using the Model 200 KeySafe

Congratulations! You are now holding the keys of one of the relatively few wearers who have an advanced high-security chastity keyholding device. Since the site and the KeySafe Model 200 were designed to work together, you have "unlocked" the most advanced features of the site. Please take a few minutes to become familiar with what is available when you hold the electronic keys to a Model 200 KeySafe. It will make your keyholding experience much more satisfying.

What You Need to Know About How the Model 200 KeySafe Works

The Model 200 KeySafe is designed as a high security safe and is pretty close to being the ultimate in remote chastity control. If it is properly set up by the wearer and properly monitored by the KeyHolder, it is virtually impossible for the wearer to access the keys to his chastity without you being aware of the attempt.

The Model 200 is connected directly to the Internet and does not go through a PC. Because it "speaks" directly to the KeySafe site without passing through the PC's software, it is possible to use sophisticated software checks to prevent any attempts to send false signals to the safe (or the site). So as long as the safe is plugged in and connected to the web, you will know everything that is done with the safe.

The key to getting maximum enjoyment out of KeyHolding with a Model 200 safe is to realize that the safe is all about insuring and enhancing your control of your wearer's chastity. If you don't care if they are really locked up or enjoy the power of knowing they are *truly* dependent on you for their access, then you could find the Model 200 more trouble to control than its worth.

On the other hand, if you enjoy the power that comes from knowing that you have total control, the Model 200 will give you hours of pleasure. A few details about how the safe works will help insure that you have all the control you want.

The safe (front shown above) can be opened in three ways. To make sure you have real control, you need to account for all three ways of opening the safe.

- The first way to open the safe (and the only one that you directly control) is for you to send an open command to the safe via your Keys page on the Keysafe site. This is explained in much more detail in the next section, but for now you should know that you can send a simple permission to open the safe, play a game with the wearer that only opens the safe if he wins, or send a "secret" signal directly to the safe to unlock that the wearer can only find if looking directly at the safe, but which he cannot see on the site. Also, there are many hidden software checks to make sure that the safe only recognizes electronic signals to open sent by the Keysafe website.

- The second way to open the safe is via the keypad you can see on the front of the safe in the photo above. There are two types of codes that will open the safe this way. First, you can enable a "911" emergency function (which we strongly recommend for safety). If enabled, the wearer can punch in 911 on the keypad and the safe will open. **However, his use of 911 will show up in bright Red in his History file and you will know virtually instantly that he has opened the safe.** You can then make sure that it was an "Emergency."

Also, the software makes four one-time use 8-digit combinations available to **you**. If you choose to give one or more of these to the wearer (and he has no way to get one of these codes other than from you), then he can punch it into the safe at any time and open the safe. At first blush, it is hard to see why you would ever want to use these codes, but as will be described in the next section, there are many games you can play that involve these codes. If you do use them, you can rest assured that **when the wearer punches in one of the codes, it shows up in bright Red on his History file.** In fact, *any* code he tries to punch in is recorded and shows up in bright red. So if your wearer even makes an attempt to open the safe via the keypad, you will know about it.

- The third way to open the safe is by using one of the two manual keys shipped with the safe and which use the keyhole hidden under a center panel on the front of the safe (as seen in the picture above). There are two ways that you can deal with the security risk this poses. The first is to ask your wearer to put the keys into the safe itself (no manual keys, no way to use them to unlock), but many wearers will be reluctant to do this since if there is a power problem, they won't be able to get into the safe. The second way is to basically ignore the problem. **Every time the key is used to manually open the safe, a bright Red message warning that the "Safe's bolts have been abnormally unlocked" appears in the History file.** You instantly know that something very naughty has happened and can act accordingly.

This discussion illustrates the underlying security philosophy of the KeySafe Model 200. It is much easier to monitor and report on attempts to open the safe than it is to control all attempts.

Another example will give you even more insight into the security features of the safe. All of the above warnings only work if the safe is powered up and connected to the web. If a wearer disconnected the safe or unplugged it, then he could use the keys to open the safe and you would never know it.

This is an unavoidable problem. The chip in the safe can't record data without power. However, the safe will report if it is connected to the web and warn you that the power was cut. You may not be able to tell exactly what happened when the power was off, but you will see a bright red warning in the history file that the power was restarted and possibly dozens of odd messages as the safe powers up. By the way, you should insist that your wearer use an Uninterruptible Power Supply (essentially a battery attached to his surge protector). That way, if the power to his place goes out, then he will still be getting power to the safe and you will not get those nasty red messages.

Of course all of the above security features are pointless if your wearer isn't actually locked up and if his keys aren't really all in the safe. However, we will assume that you have insured your wearers are locked to your satisfaction. Now let's look at the tools the site gives you to make them dance to your will.

How to Use the Key Control Page with a Model 200 KeySafe



This section will only really make complete sense if you have read the PDF file *A Holders Guide to Managing Keys on Keysafe* that can be found using the Documentation link at the bottom of any page on the KeySafe site. What follows assumes that you have read that document and already know the general features of the Keys page.

- Right below the pink titles you will see a new box "**911**". To let your wearer have the ability to punch 911 into the keypad and open the safe, check this box. If unchecked, the wearer will **not** be able to use 911 to open the safe in an emergency. Only you can set this field, the wearer has no toggle. **For safety in case of a true emergency, we recommend enabling this at all times. Remember if it is used, it will show up in bright Red on the wearer's History page.**

- At the far right of the page, just under the pink label **Permission Result**, you will see a link in blue that reports on the current status of any permissions you have granted. If you click on this link (*pending* in the above sample), you will be taken to the wearer's History page. The History page contains critical information about what your wearer is doing with the safe. Everything you or he does with the safe will show up on this page and any potential trouble will show up as a bright red warning. You should check the History page every time you visit the Keys page to find out what is really happening with your wearer(s). At the end of this section, we give a detailed example of the use of this page.

- A new line of information has appeared below the general information about your wearer You will see **Keypad Unlock** followed by four (4) eight digit numbers. These are single use combinations that you can give to your wearer to open the safe a single time. Only you can pass them along to your wearer; he has no other way of getting these numbers. Once each is used, the number will vanish from your Keys display and a new combination will take its place. Remember that if your wearer uses a single use permission combination that it will show up in red on his History page.

  Why would you ever want to give your wearer a "free" one-time access to his safe (and his chastity)? We will give three reasons, but there are many more. First, your wearer may have a spouse or partner. They may be willing to let you control his chastity, but they may want occasional access. By using the codes, the partner does not have to keep a key to the chastity. Instead, if you send some codes to the partner, he/she can get access but you will see that the code was used and you will know who opened the safe. You keep control, but they have occasional access.

  A second reason for using one of the single-use codes is as a "gift" to your wearer. You may be going away for a while and be unable to spend time on the site. In that case you may want to give your wearer one or more codes that they can use as they wish while you are gone (with instructions to lock up and submit whatever verification you require after they use the code). However, once the code is used, the safe is once again inaccessible. This can be surprisingly tormenting to a wearer. If you know you have one release in 3 months and that is it, you are really tormented about when to use that one shot.

  A third way to use the single-use codes is as part of a sadistic game with your wearer. You can give him or her one digit each time some task is completed successfully (or a milestone is reached). After all 8 are digits are earned, he or she gets a "bonus" release. Of course, you don't have to give the digits in order which can extend this game quite a bit as you slowly help them get the number right (or not depending on how sadistic you are).

- On the far right of the Keys Page under the general information about your Wearer you will find one of the most important sets of information on this page. Right after the label **Safe Status** you will see 4 critical pieces of information. If these are all blue, then the safe (and the chastity) is secure. If even one if red, the chastity is not secure. The first data item tells you if the safe is *online or offline.*

Online means the power is on and the safe is directly connected to the website. Offline means the connection between the safe and site is broken and you don't know what is happening.

The second data item (*no tamper/tamper*) indicates whether there is a potential attempt to tamper with the safe's electronics. There is a plexiglass shield covering the electronics in the safe and if the shield is fully screwed on, it closes an electronic switch and sends the *no tamper* message to the site. There is no way for the wearer to screw around with the electronics and change some of the settings. If the shield if loosened to let hands or tools get in, then the switch will open and a *tamper* message will appear. If the safe is closed (and hasn't been opened recently) and/or there is a rapid succession of *tamper/no tamper* signals, then it is likely just a glitch and you should talk to your wearer about opening the safe door and tightening the screws to the shield.

The third data item tells you whether the bolts to the safe's door are *locked or unlocked*. This is pretty obvious. If the bolts are locked and the door is closed, then no one is getting into that safe. On the other hand if the door is closed and the bolts are unlocked then the door can be opened anytime your wearer wants to open it. Unless you have sent a signal to open the safe, you should always see the *bolts locked* message.

The final data item displays *door closed/door open*. This is pretty obvious and is the last line of defense. You should only see a red *door open* message when you want that door open; otherwise you know something unauthorized is going on.

- You can use the site to give your wearer permission to unlock in three different ways. First, you can give an open-ended permission by using the pull down list under Current Permission and clicking on yes. Now whenever your wearer next checks their Keys page, they will see that you have granted a permission, which they can accept or decline. If they accept, the system will immediately send a command to unlock the safe. Most wearer's don't know this, but if they delay unlocking the safe, you can cancel the unlock by granting another permission and then immediately withdrawing it. This has the effect of canceling all unused permissions and as soon as the withdraw message reaches the safe (max about 90 seconds) then their chance vanishes.

- The second way to grant permission is to set one or more permission windows. Use the pull down list under Current Permission and click on Window. This will

activate the Window Start and Duration fields and by following the instructions that pop up when you click on the blue titles of those fields you can set one or more windows of opportunity for your wearer of almost any duration starting anytime you want. If they happen to check their Keys page while a window you set is open, then they will get a permission as described above. However, if they miss a window, they will get a message telling them that they had a chance and they missed it!

You can also play a dice game with your wearer using either the open-ended permission or windows. If the wearer wins the game, they get an unlock sent to the safe; if they lose, they do **not** get an unlock. You can set a wide range of odds of your wearer winning a release.

- There is a third way to grant a permission that is only available on the Model 200. Under **Features/Options** there is a new choice labeled *remote unlock*. This is a very powerful "stealth" unlock. Normally, your wearer must check-in on the Keys page on the KeySafe site to find out if he has a permission to unlock. *Remote unlock* bypasses the Keys page and sends a message straight to the safe where a yellow light flashes to indicate that the wearer can open the safe. No other warning of an unlock is given.

  You can really torment a wearer with this setting. Let us say you set a short window giving a *remote unlock.* He will go check his Keys page and see that you are using remote unlock. All he knows is that at some point, his safe *could* start to blink. If desperate enough, he will start to check the safe at all hours; he may even sleep near it, hoping the flashing yellow light will wake him….and if he misses the chance, he won't find out until he checks out his own History page.

- Be sure to always click on *Record Changes* when setting a window or making other changes or the system will not recognize those changes. The *Refresh/Discard* button lets you undo any changes you have made since you last recorded your changes. It also refreshes the data on the screen and is very useful for updating **Safe Status** information.

- There is a drop down box at the bottom of the Keys page near the *Refresh/Discard Changes* button that lets you switch between displaying times in your time zone and displaying times in the wearers' zone(s). Click on the box and set it to *Using Wearer Time Zones*. Now the page refreshes just like pressing the *Refresh/Discard* button **and** start times for *all* your wearers will now be shown in their respective time zones. Keep in mind that you must change the time zones *before* making

other changes to the page or you will lose those changes when you switch time zones.

- Finally, each time you come back to the site after having set the first window or granted a permission, be sure to click on the short message (such as Accepted) just below the **Permission Result** label. You will then be taken to the wearer's History page. It is here that you can see if they found your permission and if they accepted and used it. It also shows all attempts to fiddle with the safe. Let's look at a sample and see the large amount of information it gives you.

Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:34:11 am	Safe's Bolts have been relocked		
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:34:09 am	Safe's door has been closed		
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:34:09 am	Safe's door has been opened	1 time(s)	
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:34:08 am	Safe's Bolts abnormally unlocked	1 time(s)	Accept
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:32:20 am	Safe's door has been closed		
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:32:20 am	Safe's Bolts have been relocked		
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:32:19 am	Safe's door has been opened	1 time(s)	
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:32:17 am	Safe's Bolts abnormally unlocked	1 time(s)	accepted
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:32:11 am	Invalid Number entered via Keypad	12345678	Accept
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:32:05 am	Safe's door has been closed		
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:32:05 am	Safe's Bolts have been relocked		
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:32:03 am	Safe's door has been opened	1 time(s)	
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:32:03 am	Safe's Bolts normally unlocked	1 time(s)	
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:32:01 am	Safe unlocked due to '911' being entered	911	Accept
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:30:59 am	Wearers dice roll is unlucky	2 4 3 6	
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:30:59 am	Wearer tries to roll this result:	All 4 dice added together must equal 21	
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:29:39 am	Permission Window Set	Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:29:39 am for 5 minutes	
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:28:40 am	Safe's door has been closed		
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:28:40 am	Safe's Bolts have been relocked		
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:28:39 am	Safe's door has been opened	1 time(s)	
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:28:39 am	Safe's Bolts normally unlocked	1 time(s)	
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:28:39 am	Keysafe Model Two unlocked with 'B' key		
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:28:20 am	An Unlock was sent to a Keysafe Model Two		
Sat Jan 14, 2012 11:28:14 am	Holder Permission was Granted		

The most recent information is always at the top of the History page, so let us start at the bottom of the page. First a remote unlock was granted and used. The safe door was unlocked and opened once and then relocked. Next, the Holder set a window and a low odds dice game for the Wearer. He found the window, but lost the game. Later he used 911 to open the safe and properly relocked it. Our sneaky wearer then tried to guess a combination and failing in that attempt,

he used the manual key twice to open the safe, which he then re-locked but not without leaving a clear record in his file.

Note that some of these events are colored in Blue and others in Red. A Keysafe can generate a lot of information so we use a color code to alert KeyHolders as to acceptable and potentially unacceptable ways your wearer accesses the safe. Events in Blue are unlocks which are acceptable to the KeyHolder. Any unlock which happens directly because of an action by you (such as a permission you sent or a dice game you set up) will show up in Blue.

Any unlock which you did not *directly* initiate via the site (such as a 911 or unlocking the safe using the manual key) will show up in Red by default. However, *if* you feel that any of these Red accesses are actually OK, then you can click on the *Accept* button to the far right of the History screen and it will immediately switch to Blue. In the example above, you may have instructed your wearer to use the manual key the first time because he had to go to the doctor suddenly and you weren't near a PC to send an unlock. This opening of the safe was actually authorized by you, so you switched it to Blue in his record. You did NOT approve the next use of the manual key, so it stays Red.

Why would you want to take the trouble to change the colors of any of these events? It comes down to how useful you want information to be. A Red message is the sign of a "bad" boy. If you have a long KeySafe relationship with someone, you might forget that when you first accepted the keys, you and your wearer tested all the features of the safe and when scanning the History file months later might draw an erroneous conclusion about how well your chastity slave was responding to your control if you don't make the tests Blue. The color-coding is also information to others about your chastity relationship. Anyone can see a lot of the details of your wearer's History and if they see a sea of Red, they will conclude that your wearer is disobedient and that (possibly) you are not very effective at controlling a wearer. These sources of confusion can be avoided by properly labeling questionable events as they occur.

That's it – now you know how to use the Key Control Page to tease, torment and (maybe) grant a release to your wearer with a Model 200 KeySafe. However as noted above, there is much, much more available to a KeyHolder than can be summarized in this document. Please check out the document *A Holders Guide to Managing Keys on KeySafe* (available on the Documentation page of the site) to learn more about the fun features you can use.

Managing The Wearer With a KeySafe

How Being Locked Up Using A KeySafe is Different for a Wearer

You will likely find that your wearers with a KeySafe Model 200 behave differently from those without a safe.

1. First, the safes are not cheap, so if a wearer has purchased one, he or she has clearly made a commitment to chastity and is likely to be more serious about it than the typical wearer on the site.

2. Second, the KeySafe Model 200 makes long-distance control much more real to the wearer. If the keys to their chastity really are in the safe, then they are truly dependent on the holder. This dependence has a number of possible effects.

    - **Chastity control with a KeySafe can be very intense and wearers are justifiably concerned about the risks associated with truly giving control to someone they don't know.** You may find that the wearer wants a lot more negotiation and/or a trial period of keyholding without using the safe before actually putting their chastity keys into the safe.

    - **To address these concerns, a trial period for every new keyholding relationship is built into the site's software. You should know that there are 6 specific days during the first month of keyholding that a wearer can withdraw their offer and get their keys back. These opportunities to withdraw the keys occur on the 7th, 14th, 21st, and 28th, 29th, and 30th days after you accept their keys. The days the keys can be withdrawn have been spread out so that both of you can get a taste of what it is like for you to truly control the wearer's chastity and know that he can NOT get out whenever he wants. This period gives you both a chance to negotiate and learn about how to make chastity work to everyone's satisfaction.**

    - **After the first month has passed, the wearer cannot take their keys back unless you have not logged into the site during the last 30 days.** Sadly, some Holders play for a while and then disappear and this 30-day option

protects wearers from those Holders. This is only an option and if the two of you are happy with only occasionally visiting the site, then the wearer can just ignore the option.

- Once you start in earnest, the wearer is likely to find it very important to demonstrate to you that he/she is really locked up. They need to know that you know how much control you have over them.

- The wearer may become much more needy and especially need more reassurance since if they are serious, they can no longer get out even if they want to. This makes them MUCH more attuned to possible deceptions on your part. If they discover you are not who you have said you are, they are likely to be deeply hurt and psychologically wounded.

- A wearer is likely to become more submissive to you over time as they strive to please the person who controls their access.

- However, a few wearers will become more aggressive, bratty or whiney when they hit the inevitable rough spots in chastity and discover they can't just end it on their own.

- Overall, a chastity relationship with a wearer with a KeySafe Model 200 is likely to be more time consuming and you will have to deal with more strong emotions than is typical on the site. The wearer will expect you to be there for emergencies and also to support him/her. **If you don't think you can or want to check in regularly and/or invest the time needed to maintain and sustain this kind of very intense chastity relationship, it makes sense to promptly return the wearer's keys. Remember, if they are playing it straight with you, they can't get out if you tune out.**

3. Third, once you have built a strong long-term chastity relationship with a wearer and you **both** feel that you communicate and work together well, you can use the KeySafe for extremely advanced and hard-core chastity and control. Some long-term couples that are seriously into chastity have agreed to lock the wearer into a high security belt, place all the keys into the KeySafe and place both of the manual keys into the safe as well.

   These wearers are completely dependent on their KeyHolders. In an emergency where the KeyHolder can't be reached, the wearer must break open the metal safe, which is a very difficult thing to do (although it is possible). The KeyHolder

will of course soon be aware of this and he/she can figure out how they wish to handle it. The cost of getting out of chastity becomes so high, that the KeyHolder can be assured that she/he has total control under all but emergency circumstances. However, this is **very advanced** play and should not be attempted without the full and voluntary consent of both parties.

4. Fourth, although a wearer with a KeySafe is likely to be more serious about chastity, he/she is paradoxically more likely to play some wearer tricks. The next section helps prepare you for these tricks.

KeySafe Wearer's Tricks

Wearers with a KeySafe Model 200 are no more inclined to try to deceive/mislead their KeyHolders than the typical wearer. However, since this KeySafe makes it truly possible to be locked up with no way out, a prudent wearer is likely to try to hedge his bets.

As a KeyHolder, you need to know the security soft spots of the Model 200 KeySafe mentioned at the beginning so you can take appropriate steps to make sure you are getting the keyholding experience that works for you. Of course, the wearer may have different ideas and if you can't reach agreement, the best course is to return the keys and look for someone who is a better fit.

You also have no way of knowing if the wearer has actually put all the keys to the chastity into the safe. Everything can be locked up securely, but the wearer has a hidden key.

There are various ways to deal with this security issue. Two basic tools are the web cam and the laminated key. If you and the wearer have web cam access, it is a simple matter to ask the wearer to buy a particular type of high-security lock (or send one yourself), open the package on camera, let you see the chastity locked with that lock and then both keys placed into the KeySafe along with one of the two manual keys. You can then watch the wearer lock the safe on camera and make sure they tug on the chastity lock to verify that it is actually locked. Every time you grant a permission that is accepted, you could watch them relock the chastity and the safe on the web cam. Note that the manual key to the safe is the emergency key in this case and as mentioned earlier, you can always use the History page to tell if it has been used.

Another way to create an emergency key (eliminating the need for hidden keys) is to heavily tape one of the keys to the lock to a piece of a local newspaper or magazine showing a date. The newspaper and key can then be laminated using a cheap manual lamination kit available for a few dollars at an office supply store or put into a cheap, breakable plastic lockbox. Now the wearer can get the chastity off in an emergency, but you will know if they have used the emergency key because the laminate will have been cut (or lockbox opened). You can periodically ask for a photo of the emergency key to make sure it hasn't been used. Even without a web cam, the laminated key idea provides a reasonable compromise between the wearer's understandable need for some security in case something happens to you and your desire for real control.

Another option, which can be used quite effectively in conjunction with these two basic tools, is to make use of the attached cable inside the safe (if your wearer ordered a cable). You can send your wearer a lock of your choice and two keys (laminating one yourself if you want). Any non-laminated keys can then be attached to the cable while you watch on web cam. Once it is secured, you should have the wearer use the now "cabled" keys to open the lock (to make sure he actually attached the real keys). From this point on, you can be sure that all keys are accounted for; you can always ask to check a laminated emergency key and the safe door cannot be closed unless the cable (with keys) is completely inside. This is only a suggestion, there are other ways to make sure the keys are attached to the cable if you are interested in that level of security.

What you want out of the keyholding experience could of course range from comfort with complete fantasy to a desire for total reality. Wherever you fall on that range, knowing how the KeySafe Model 200 works and what tricks chastity wearers *could* play should help you make sure you get the type of chastity experience you really want.